| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mediatek: dsi: Store driver data before invoking mipi_dsi_host_register
The call to mipi_dsi_host_register triggers a callback to mtk_dsi_bind,
which uses dev_get_drvdata to retrieve the mtk_dsi struct, so this
structure needs to be stored inside the driver data before invoking it.
As drvdata is currently uninitialized it leads to a crash when
registering the DSI DRM encoder right after acquiring
the mode_config.idr_mutex, blocking all subsequent DRM operations.
Fixes the following crash during mediatek-drm probe (tested on Xiaomi
Smart Clock x04g):
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
0000000000000040
[...]
Modules linked in: mediatek_drm(+) drm_display_helper cec drm_client_lib
drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper panel_simple
[...]
Call trace:
drm_mode_object_add+0x58/0x98 (P)
__drm_encoder_init+0x48/0x140
drm_encoder_init+0x6c/0xa0
drm_simple_encoder_init+0x20/0x34 [drm_kms_helper]
mtk_dsi_bind+0x34/0x13c [mediatek_drm]
component_bind_all+0x120/0x280
mtk_drm_bind+0x284/0x67c [mediatek_drm]
try_to_bring_up_aggregate_device+0x23c/0x320
__component_add+0xa4/0x198
component_add+0x14/0x20
mtk_dsi_host_attach+0x78/0x100 [mediatek_drm]
mipi_dsi_attach+0x2c/0x50
panel_simple_dsi_probe+0x4c/0x9c [panel_simple]
mipi_dsi_drv_probe+0x1c/0x28
really_probe+0xc0/0x3dc
__driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x40/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0xbc/0x17c
bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xf0
__device_attach+0x9c/0x1cc
device_initial_probe+0x54/0x60
bus_probe_device+0x34/0xa0
device_add+0x5b0/0x800
mipi_dsi_device_register_full+0xdc/0x16c
mipi_dsi_host_register+0xc4/0x17c
mtk_dsi_probe+0x10c/0x260 [mediatek_drm]
platform_probe+0x5c/0xa4
really_probe+0xc0/0x3dc
__driver_probe_device+0x80/0x160
driver_probe_device+0x40/0x120
__driver_attach+0xc8/0x1f8
bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0
driver_attach+0x24/0x30
bus_add_driver+0x11c/0x240
driver_register+0x68/0x130
__platform_register_drivers+0x64/0x160
mtk_drm_init+0x24/0x1000 [mediatek_drm]
do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d0
do_init_module+0x54/0x240
load_module+0x1838/0x1dc0
init_module_from_file+0xd8/0xf0
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1b4/0x428
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x48/0xc8
do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xb8
el0_svc+0x34/0xe8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: 52800022 941004ab 2a0003f3 37f80040 (29005a80) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/efa: Fix use of completion ctx after free
On admin queue completion handling, if the admin command completed with
error we print data from the completion context. The issue is that we
already freed the completion context in polling/interrupts handler which
means we print data from context in an unknown state (it might be
already used again).
Change the admin submission flow so alloc/dealloc of the context will be
symmetric and dealloc will be called after any potential use of the
context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip_tunnel: adapt iptunnel_xmit_stats() to NETDEV_PCPU_STAT_DSTATS
Blamed commits forgot that vxlan/geneve use udp_tunnel[6]_xmit_skb() which
call iptunnel_xmit_stats().
iptunnel_xmit_stats() was assuming tunnels were only using
NETDEV_PCPU_STAT_TSTATS.
@syncp offset in pcpu_sw_netstats and pcpu_dstats is different.
32bit kernels would either have corruptions or freezes if the syncp
sequence was overwritten.
This patch also moves pcpu_stat_type closer to dev->{t,d}stats to avoid
a potential cache line miss since iptunnel_xmit_stats() needs to read it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ima: Fix stack-out-of-bounds in is_bprm_creds_for_exec()
KASAN reported a stack-out-of-bounds access in ima_appraise_measurement
from is_bprm_creds_for_exec:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ima_appraise_measurement+0x12dc/0x16a0
Read of size 1 at addr ffffc9000160f940 by task sudo/550
The buggy address belongs to stack of task sudo/550
and is located at offset 24 in frame:
ima_appraise_measurement+0x0/0x16a0
This frame has 2 objects:
[48, 56) 'file'
[80, 148) 'hash'
This is caused by using container_of on the *file pointer. This offset
calculation is what triggers the stack-out-of-bounds error.
In order to fix this, pass in a bprm_is_check boolean which can be set
depending on how process_measurement is called. If the caller has a
linux_binprm pointer and the function is BPRM_CHECK we can determine
is_check and set it then. Otherwise set it to false. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix UAF on lgr list traversal in smcr_port_err()
smcr_port_err() traverses smc_lgr_list.list without holding
smc_lgr_list.lock, allowing a concurrent smc_lgr_terminate_sched()
to free an lgr while it is still being dereferenced.
Hold smc_lgr_list.lock across the traversal. Update
smc_ib_gid_check() to call smcr_port_err() after releasing the lock. |
| The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c validated its two output parameters, buff and buff_len, with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() rather than K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(). Both are pure out-parameters: z_impl_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() stores the mempool buffer address and its length through them. The distinction is enforced by every architecture validator — arch_buffer_validate() on RISC-V PMP explicitly accepts the global __rom_region/__rodata_region for reads only, and the ARM MPU validators accept P_RO_U_RO and P_RW_U_RO regions for reads only — so a read-validated pointer is not necessarily writable by the calling thread.
An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to an RTIO context (rtio_access_grant()) can invoke the rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() syscall with buff/buff_len pointing at memory it may read but not write, and with a completion-queue entry whose flags field it fully controls (only RTIO_CQE_FLAG_MEMPOOL_BUFFER in flags[7:0] is required; flags[19:8] and flags[31:20] supply the block index and count). The kernel then performs a pointer-sized and a 4-byte store through those addresses while running in supervisor mode. Reaching the store requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_RTIO_SYS_MEM_BLOCKS, the configuration behind RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL; without the latter the implementation returns -ENOTSUP and writes nothing.
Two outcomes follow. If the target lies in a memory-domain partition declared K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_RO (privileged read-write, user read-only), the kernel-mode store succeeds and deposits partly attacker-chosen values into memory the memory domain had marked read-only for that thread, bypassing the partition's write protection. If the target lies in globally readable but unwritable memory such as .text/.rodata in flash, the store faults in kernel mode; the fault is delivered to z_fatal_error() and the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() halts or reboots the device, giving an unprivileged thread a reliable full denial of service.
The read-permission check does bound the damage: the address must still be readable by the calling thread, so kernel-private memory cannot be targeted and no confidential data is disclosed. The fix replaces both checks with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(), so a thread lacking write permission is terminated by K_OOPS before the implementation runs; the cqe argument correctly remains read-validated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
The verifier tracks changes in how PTR_TO_PACKET registers'
bounds are modified across subprog boundaries. PTR_TO_PACKET
registers are actually passed as PTR_TO_MEM, which is assumed
valid for the entire call. This is not the case with packet memory,
where a pskb_* call may invalidate its memory region.
Reject BPF code that passes PTR_TO_PACKET pointers to subprogs that
may mutate a packet. We cannot pass the pointer as a true PTR_TO_PACKET
because we would also need to somehow pass the PTR_TO_PACKET_META
or PTR_TO_PACKET_END to the subprog. Since we cannot avoid representing
the pointer in the subprog as PTR_TO_MEM, only permit it if the
subprog is guaranteed not to mutate the packet. |
| The Web add-on's HTTP server dereferences and releases an uninitialized pointer when it detects a `Content-Length` underflow while processing a `PUT` request. The condition is reachable by an unauthenticated remote client with a single malformed request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: stop Tx NAPI before disabling the queues
bcmgenet_netif_stop() and the Wake-on-LAN branch of bcmgenet_suspend()
both disable the Tx queues first and stop Tx NAPI several steps later. A
completion in flight calls netif_tx_wake_queue() in between, and nothing
stops the queue again, so a transmit can reach the rings after they have
been freed.
Close is safe because dev_deactivate_many() stops the qdisc first.
bcmgenet_suspend() does not, so stop Tx NAPI before the queues on both
paths.
KASAN on a Raspberry Pi CM4, driven from an MTU change because suspend
freezes user space before the callback runs:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bcmgenet_xmit+0x17f8/0x2258
Write of size 8 at addr ffffff8055844a68 by task ksoftirqd/0/14
bcmgenet_xmit+0x17f8/0x2258
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13c/0x588
sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x340
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1190/0x3848 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix race condition in accept_queue lifecycle
In nfc_llcp_socket_release(), sockets and listener accept queues are
walked under the local sockets rwlock and bh_lock_sock(). However,
bh_lock_sock() does not synchronise against process-context lock_sock()
held by nfc_llcp_accept_dequeue() during accept(). Because
socket_release() does not check sock_owned_by_user(), both paths can
concurrently unlink and release the same child socket, resulting in
use-after-free or a NULL pointer dereference of child->parent in
nfc_llcp_accept_unlink().
Fix this synchronisation race by having nfc_llcp_socket_release() use
process-context lock_sock() instead of bh_lock_sock():
1. Pop sockets from the local sockets list under the write lock using
nfc_llcp_sock_list_pop() so lock_sock() can be acquired without
holding the rwlock.
2. Because lock_sock() can sleep, defer the final release of the
nfc_llcp_local structure to a workqueue (release_work). This avoids
a sleeping-in-atomic bug when the last local reference is dropped
from softirq context. Additionally, hold a single device reference
on local from registration until final destruction.
3. In nfc_llcp_local_get(), use kref_get_unless_zero() to prevent
resurrecting a local object whose teardown has been scheduled.
4. In llcp_sock_accept(), verify that the listener socket state is still
LLCP_LISTEN after waking from schedule_timeout() to prevent hangs if
the listener is closed concurrently.
5. When unlinking unaccepted child sockets during listener release,
unlink them from local->sockets, call sock_orphan(), and drop their
initial sk_alloc creation reference via sock_put().
6. Make nfc_llcp_accept_unlink() idempotent by guarding parent access with
a NULL check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: spacemit: clear TX descriptor on fragment mapping failure
emac_tx_mem_map() writes TX_DESC_0_OWN into the ring descriptor for
every slot beyond old_head as soon as that slot's memset()'d local
copy is committed with "*tx_desc_addr = tx_desc", i.e. before the
buffers for that slot have necessarily all been mapped successfully.
If emac_tx_map_frag() then fails on a later fragment, the err_free_skb
path calls emac_free_tx_buf() to unmap and drop the skb, but leaves
the already-written descriptor memory untouched, and tx_ring->head is
never advanced past old_head (the "tx_ring->head = head" store is
skipped by the goto).
So a slot between old_head and the rolled-back head can be left with
TX_DESC_0_OWN set and buffer_addr_{1,2} pointing at DMA mappings that
emac_free_tx_buf() just tore down, while software considers that slot
free again. The next successful emac_tx_mem_map() call only rebuilds
old_head itself; if the DMA engine auto-advances into the following
descriptor once it finishes old_head's packet, it will fetch that
stale, already-unmapped address.
emac_tx_clean_desc() already treats emac_free_tx_buf() and clearing
the descriptor as a pair when reclaiming completed descriptors; do
the same in the mapping failure path. |
| Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Network File System allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows NTFS allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: do not dissolve gigantic pages without runtime support
dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio() doesn't check
hstate_is_gigantic_no_runtime(h) though remove_hugetlb_folio()/
update_and_free_hugetlb_folio() silently bail for such folios, so it frees
a still-listed folio and, on vmemmap restore failure, the
add_hugetlb_folio() rollback corrupts the free list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
writeback: report a Tasks-RCU quiescent state per cgwb drain pass
cleanup_offline_cgwbs_workfn() drains a dying cgwb by calling
cleanup_offline_cgwb() until it returns false, with a cond_resched()
between passes. On a CONFIG_PREEMPTION kernel that cond_resched() does
nothing: _cond_resched() is a plain "return 0", and under PREEMPT_DYNAMIC
the full and lazy modes disable it. Since commit 7dadeaa6e851 ("sched:
Further restrict the preemption modes") those are the only two models on
the architectures with PREEMPT_LAZY support, arm64 and x86 among them, so
the drain loop never reports a Tasks-RCU quiescent state.
A worker draining a cgwb with millions of attached inodes runs for
minutes. On a 6.18 arm64 host in lazy mode the cgwb worker drained one
dying cgroup's writeback domain for over 11 minutes. A BPF program unlink
(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog -> bpf_trampoline_update ->
unregister_ftrace_direct -> ftrace_shutdown -> synchronize_rcu_tasks())
waited on that grace period while holding the trampoline mutex, 42 tasks
queued behind it in D state, and the hung task detector fired at 614 s and
panicked the host. Any BPF or ftrace detach during a long drain inherits
the drain's length.
Fix this by calling cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs() so we do not stall out
anybody who calls sycnrhonize_rcu_tasks(). We put this in a do { } while
loop because if we have many small cgroups cleanup_offline_cgwb() will
return false and we will never call cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs(), creating
the same problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched_ext: Derive SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP from the core enqueue flags
schedule_deferred_locked() skips scheduling a deferred action while
SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP is set and relies on the task_woken_scx() call that follows
a wakeup enqueue to run it. enqueue_task_scx() sets the flag from the merged
enqueue flags, which include the flags stashed for a remote activation.
move_remote_task_to_local_dsq() thus sets SCX_RQ_IN_WAKEUP on the
destination rq when the moved task was woken up, although no
task_woken_scx() follows that activation.
An IMMED insert into a busy destination requests a local reenqueue during
that enqueue. The request gets linked but not scheduled and stays pending
until an unrelated wakeup or preemption on that CPU runs the deferred
actions. The IMMED task sits behind the running task in the meantime. If
nothing runs them before the scheduler is disabled, the request outlives the
scheduler and points into its freed per-cpu area, which the next scheduler
dereferences from run_deferred().
Test the core enqueue flags for the wakeup bit. Only the core's wakeup path
is followed by task_woken_scx(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use ubuf_info completion for TX_RING packets
tpacket_snd sends skbs with frags pointing into its ring slots. Slots
are released when skb->destructor is called.
A call to skb_orphan calls skb->destructor before the skb is freed.
This can cause the slot to be reused while still linked into the skb.
Switch to standard zerocopy completion (ubuf_info) so the slot is only
released once all references to the payload are freed or copied.
Restore skb->destructor to standard sock_wfree.
The ubuf_info completion callback can be called with a NULL skb, but
only from net_zcopy_put and related API, used by zerocopy implementations
that hold their own reference on the uarg, such as MSG_ZEROCOPY. This
uarg is only ever completed from skb_zcopy_clear, so skb is always set.
To prevent userspace from aliasing in-flight state on shared ring
slots, allocate tpacket_uarg per packet, rather than per slot. This
adds a small allocation to the transmit path. Use standard kmalloc to
allow backporting to stable kernels.
The uarg holds an sk_wmem_alloc reference, rather than an sk_refcnt
reference. packet_free_tx_ring waits on sk_wmem_alloc before freeing
the ring pages. Always allocate vec->deferred for tx_ring so page-backed
rings also wait on sk_wmem_alloc when skb_copy_ubufs drops page refs
before calling tpacket_ubuf_complete.
Drop the tx_ring.pg_vec test that tpacket_destruct_skb performed before
accessing the slot. The sk_wmem_alloc reference now guarantees that the
slot is valid. The test is also not sufficient by itself, as it reads
pg_vec without pg_vec_lock, so it can race with packet_set_ring.
As a result a slot is released when its payload is copied, which can
be before transmission (e.g., in skb_orphan_frags_rx). If copied
before skb_tx_timestamp() is called, no slot timestamp is recorded,
similar to when skb_orphan() was called early in the datapath before
this patch.
Revert the now unused previous skb_zcopy_.._nouarg infra.
Depends on commit 992cc9f94ca9 ("net/packet: defer vmalloc TX_RING
free until skbs finish"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: ib: Clear the sg list when mapping an MR fails
rds_ib_map_frmr() stores the caller's scatterlist in the MR before DMA
mapping and registration can fail. On failure, __rds_rdma_map() unpins
the pages and frees the scatterlist, but rds_ib_free_frmr() can still
return the MR to the pool with the stale pointer set.
This leaves the pool with a dangling scatterlist and can lead to local
privilege escalation. KASAN detects the resulting use-after-free when the
MR is later torn down:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rds_ib_teardown_mr
Read of size 8
Call Trace:
__rds_ib_teardown_mr
rds_ib_unreg_frmr
rds_ib_flush_mr_pool
rds_ib_flush_mrs
rds_free_mr
rds_setsockopt
Store the scatterlist in the MR only after DMA mapping succeeds. If DMA
mapping fails, return directly while the MR fields remain clear; the caller
keeps ownership of the scatterlist and its pinned pages. If a later
registration step fails, unmap the scatterlist and clear the MR fields
before returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kprobes: Fix permanent hang when flushing the kprobe optimizer
Writing 0 to /proc/sys/debug/kprobes-optimization while a kprobe is
jump-optimized never returns. The writer sleeps in D state forever with
kprobe_sysctl_mutex held, so any later read or write of that sysctl
hangs as well. For example, with vfs_read+9 as an optimizable address
in this build:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo 'p:myprobe vfs_read+9' >> kprobe_events
# echo 1 > events/kprobes/myprobe/enable
# # wait until /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/list shows [OPTIMIZED]
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/debug/kprobes-optimization
INFO: task sh:246 blocked for more than 10 seconds.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x1176/0x4f70
schedule+0xdc/0x2c0
schedule_timeout+0x17b/0x260
wait_for_completion+0x173/0x3c0
wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked+0xbc/0x130
proc_kprobes_optimization_handler+0x156/0x1b0
proc_sys_call_handler+0x324/0x490
vfs_write+0x52d/0xfe0
ksys_write+0xff/0x200
do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
...
INFO: task cat:265 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task sh:246.
wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked() reinitializes optimizer_completion,
asks the optimizer thread to flush and sleeps in wait_for_completion().
The thread drains the (un)optimizing lists, but calls complete() only
if completion_done() is true, i.e. if the completion is already done,
which never happens while someone waits. disarm_all_kprobes() and
kprobe_trace_self_tests_init() wait the same way.
Calling complete() unconditionally would not be enough: the waiter
drops kprobe_mutex while it sleeps, and nothing else serializes the
sysctl handler against the debugfs "enabled" file. A second flusher
that still finds the lists non-empty, e.g. because a disabled probe is
queued for unoptimizing, reinitializes the completion under the first:
sysctl write debugfs "enabled" write
unoptimize_all_kprobes()
wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked()
init_completion(c)
mutex_unlock(&kprobe_mutex)
wait_for_completion(c)
disarm_all_kprobes()
wait_for_kprobe_optimizer_locked()
init_completion(c)
// c->wait is reset, the first
// waiter is off the queue
mutex_unlock(&kprobe_mutex)
wait_for_completion(c)
kprobe_optimizer()
complete(c)
// wakes the debugfs writer only
where c is &optimizer_completion. Lining up the two writes during an
optimizer pass loses the sysctl writer this way.
Replace the completion with a counter of optimizer passes, bumped at the
end of each pass and signalled with wake_up_var_locked(), both under
kprobe_mutex. A flusher samples the count and waits with
wait_var_event_mutex(), which drops kprobe_mutex only while sleeping, so
a new count means a whole pass ran in the meantime. Nothing is
reinitialized, so several flushers can sleep in the wait at once. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy
new_policy() audits the policy after ipe_new_policyfs_node() publishes it
and drops the new directory's inode lock. A concurrent delete can free
the policy while ipe_audit_policy_load() is still using it.
Audit the successful load under that lock.
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline] |
