| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/page_table_check: skip special zero mappings
page_table_check_set() and page_table_check_clear() account mappings based
on PageAnon(). Shared zero-page PTEs and huge zero PMDs are special
mappings, but page_table_check can still account them as file-backed
pages.
An unprivileged process can populate enough zero mappings to overflow
file_map_count and hit the existing BUG_ON(). The PTE path can do this
with the shared zero page, and the PMD path can do the same with huge zero
mappings.
Skip special zero mappings in the user page-table accounting paths. Keep
the PTE-side pte_special() check, and identify huge zero PMDs from the
mapped folio instead of pmd_special(). That covers architectures where
pmd_special() is a no-op without adding huge_zero_pfn checks to the
generic counter helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: validate offshift to prevent shift-out-of-bounds
u32_change() copies the user-provided tc_u32_sel.offshift (unsigned char,
0-255) into the kernel knode object without bounds validation. When a
packet later hits u32_classify() with TC_U32_VAROFFSET set, it evaluates
`ntohs(offmask & *data) >> offshift` where the left operand is a 16-bit
value promoted to a 32-bit int. Any offshift >= 32 is undefined behavior
per C11 6.5.7p3, triggerable by an unprivileged user via user/network
namespaces.
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/cls_u32.c:236:43
shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type int
Fix this by rejecting offshift >= 16 during filter creation in
u32_change(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: Block VFs from clobbering special CGX PKIND state
PF and VF NIX LFs that share a CGX LMAC reuse the same hardware PKIND
programming. When HiGig2 or EDSA parsing is enabled, a VF NIX LF alloc must
not reset the LMAC RX PKIND or default TX parse config over the PF setup.
Add cgx_get_pkind() and rvu_cgx_is_pkind_config_permitted() so VFs skip
cgx_set_pkind(), rvu_npc_set_pkind(), and NIX_AF_LFX_TX_PARSE_CFG updates
when the LMAC is using NPC_RX_HIGIG_PKIND or NPC_RX_EDSA_PKIND. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Close speculative mem read possibility
The domain value is extracted from a given CCA or EP11 ioctl struct
when a CPRB is about to be sent. Thus this is a user controlled value.
Under some special conditions (custom device node used, administrative
load) this value is used as an array index after bounds checking, but
without speculation barrier.
Add the missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative
execution where this domain value is used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: fix integer overflow in radeon_align_pitch()
radeon_align_pitch() has the same kind of overflow issue as the old
amdgpu helper: both the alignment round-up add and the final
'aligned * cpp' calculation can overflow signed int.
If that wraps, radeon_mode_dumb_create() can end up returning an
invalid pitch or creating a zero-sized dumb buffer.
Fix this by using check_add_overflow() for the alignment round-up and
check_mul_overflow() for the final pitch calculation, returning 0 on
overflow. Also reject zero pitch and size in
radeon_mode_dumb_create().
Found via AST-based call-graph analysis using sqry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Bound synthetic-field strings with seq_buf
The synthetic field helpers build a prefixed synthetic variable name and
a generated hist command in fixed MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL buffers. The
current code appends those strings with raw strcat(), so long key lists,
field names, or saved filters can run past the end of the staging
buffers.
Build both strings with seq_buf and propagate -E2BIG if either the
synthetic variable name or the generated command exceeds
MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL. This keeps the existing tracing-side limit while
using the helper intended for bounded command construction.
[ sdr: Moved struct seq_buf *s for upside-down x-mas tree formatting ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate fast symlink target during inode read
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() already rejects several inconsistent
self-contained dinodes before they are exposed to the rest of the
filesystem. Fast symlinks need the same treatment.
A zero-cluster symlink is treated as a fast symlink and later read through
page_get_link() and ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio(). That path uses
strnlen() on the inline payload and then copies len + 1 bytes into the
folio. If a corrupt dinode stores an i_size that does not fit the inline
area or omits the terminating NUL at i_size, that copy reads past the end
of the inode block buffer.
Reject zero-cluster symlink dinodes whose i_size exceeds the inline
fast-symlink capacity or whose inline payload is not NUL-terminated
exactly at i_size when the inode block is validated. This keeps malformed
fast symlinks from reaching the read path.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0
RIP: 0033:0x7f5c6d859aa7
Read of size 3905
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 (fs/ocfs2/inode.c:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?)
__asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 (?:?)
filemap_read_folio+0x27/0xe0 (?:?)
filemap_read_folio+0x35/0xe0 (?:?)
do_read_cache_folio+0x138/0x230 (?:?)
__page_get_link+0x26/0x110 (?:?)
page_get_link+0x2e/0x70 (?:?)
vfs_readlink+0x15e/0x250 (?:?)
touch_atime+0x4d/0x370 (?:?)
do_readlinkat+0x186/0x200 (?:?)
do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 (?:?)
__x64_sys_readlink+0x46/0x60 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wcn36xx: fix heap overflow from oversized firmware HAL response
The firmware response dispatcher copies all synchronous HAL responses
into the 4096-byte hal_buf without validating the response length. A
response exceeding WCN36XX_HAL_BUF_SIZE causes a heap buffer overflow
with firmware-controlled content.
Add a bounds check on the response length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: topology: Check PCM and DAI name strings before use
Topology objects store several PCM and DAI names in fixed-size UAPI
arrays. Other topology parser paths validate these fields with bounded
strnlen() checks before using them as C strings, but the PCM and DAI
paths still pass some fixed-size arrays directly to strlen(),
devm_kstrdup(), DAI lookup, and diagnostic prints.
A malformed topology blob with a non-NUL-terminated PCM, DAI, or stream
capability name can therefore make the parser read past the end of the
fixed-size field.
Reject unterminated PCM and DAI name fields before consuming them as C
strings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt: fix head underflow on XDP head-grow
The xdp.py test test_xdp_native_adjst_head_grow_data crashes when run on
a bnxt machine (and also crashes in NIPA).
It seems that the bug is an underflow in bnxt_rx_multi_page_skb, which
builds the skb head:
napi_build_skb(data_ptr - bp->rx_offset, rxr->rx_page_size);
The problem with this expression is that in page mode, rx_offset is:
bp->rx_offset = NET_IP_ALIGN + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM;
Which evaluates (at least on x86_64) to 258.
The test test_xdp_native_adjst_head_grow_data tests a case where the
head is adjusted by -256.
When this test runs, data_ptr is shifted to frag_start + 2 (where
frag_start = page_address(page) + offset).
Then, bnxt_rx_multi_page_skb is invoked and the napi_build_skb
expression subtracts 258, landing at an address before frag_start. This
could be either the previous fragment or the previous physical page when
the offset is < 256 (e.g. if the fragment started at offset 0).
When the skb is freed, the page pool fragment reference is dropped on
either the wrong page or the wrong frag of the right page. In either
case, the corrupted reference count can lead to the page being
prematurely recycled while still in use. Once (incorrectly) recycled, it
can be handed out again and on driver teardown this would result in a
double free.
The commit under fixes updated this code to handle the case where the
native page size is >= 64k, but it unintentionally broke the head grow
case.
To fix this, add an offset field to struct bnxt_sw_rx_bd, mirroring the
existing offset field in struct bnxt_sw_rx_agg_bd. Populate it on
allocation and preserve it on reuse.
In bnxt_rx_multi_page_skb, use the newly added offset field to compute
the fragment start and pass that to napi_build_skb. Adjust the layout
with skb_reserve.
There are two cases, the non-adjustment case and the adjustment case.
In both cases, the skb is built at page_address(page) + offset to
account for the case where the native page size >= 64K and skb_reserve
is called with data_ptr - (page_address(page) + offset). That
difference equals bp->rx_offset when data_ptr was not moved, or
bp->rx_offset + xdp_adjust when XDP adjusted the head.
Re-running the failing test with this commit applied causes the test to
run successfully to completion.
The other rx_skb_func implementations don't have this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soundwire: fix bug in sdw_add_element_group_count found by syzkaller
The original implementation caused an out-of-bounds memory access
in the sdw_add_element_group_count for-loop when i == num.
for (i = 0; i <= num; i++) {
if (rate == group->rates[i] && lane == group->lanes[i])
...
To fix this error, the function now checks for existing rate/lane
entries in the group(a function parameter) using a for-loop before
adding them.
No functional changes apart from this fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: resize log->one_page_buf when adopting on-disk page size
log_replay() allocates log->one_page_buf using the page size that was
chosen from the host PAGE_SIZE:
log->one_page_buf = kmalloc(log->page_size, GFP_NOFS);
Later, when a restart area is found, the log page size recorded on disk
is adopted:
t32 = le32_to_cpu(log->rst_info.r_page->sys_page_size);
if (log->page_size != t32) {
log->l_size = log->orig_file_size;
log->page_size = norm_file_page(t32, &log->l_size,
t32 == DefaultLogPageSize);
}
If the on-disk page size is larger than the size used for the initial
allocation, log->page_size grows but one_page_buf is left at its
original, smaller size. A subsequent unaligned read_log_page() then
reads log->page_size bytes into the undersized scratch buffer:
page_buf = page_off ? log->one_page_buf : *buffer;
err = ntfs_read_run_nb_ra(ni->mi.sbi, &ni->file.run, page_vbo, page_buf,
log->page_size, NULL, &log->read_ahead);
overflowing the allocation. This is reachable when mounting a dirty
NTFS volume whose log was formatted with a page size larger than the
buffer initially allocated on the mounting host (for example a 64K-log
volume mounted on a host that allocated a 4K scratch buffer).
Grow one_page_buf when the adopted on-disk page size exceeds the size
used for the initial allocation. On krealloc() failure the original
buffer is left intact and freed by the existing error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: reject undersized DACLs before parsing ACEs
parse_dacl() limits the attacker-controlled ACE count by comparing it
with the number of minimal ACEs that fit in the DACL size. The DACL size
field is 16 bits, but the expression subtracts sizeof(struct smb_acl).
Because sizeof() is unsigned, a DACL size smaller than the ACL header
underflows to a large size_t.
A malicious client can reach this with:
SMB2_SET_INFO (InfoType=SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY)
-> smb2_set_info_sec()
-> set_info_sec()
-> parse_sec_desc()
-> parse_dacl()
-> init_acl_state(..., 0xffff)
-> init_acl_state(..., 0xffff)
-> kmalloc_objs(..., 0xffff)
Thus a malformed security descriptor can make num_aces pass the guard
and drive large temporary ACL state and pointer-array allocations.
Reject DACLs smaller than struct smb_acl before doing the subtraction,
so the ACE count check cannot be bypassed by the underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_lookup: fix catchall element handling with inverted lookups
nft_lookup_eval() decides whether a lookup matched (`found`) from the
direct set lookup and priv->invert before falling back to the
catchall element used by interval sets (e.g. nft_set_rbtree) for the
open-ended default range. Since `found` is never recomputed after
`ext` is replaced by the catchall lookup, inverted lookups
(NFT_LOOKUP_F_INV, "!= @set") can wrongly match or wrongly skip the
catchall element, producing the wrong verdict. Fold the catchall
lookup into `ext` before computing `found`, matching the order
already used by nft_objref_map_eval(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb cgroup rsvd charge/uncharge mismatch
In alloc_hugetlb_folio(), a single h_cg pointer is used for both the rsvd
and non-rsvd hugetlb cgroup charges. When map_chg is set,
hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup_rsvd() stores the charged cgroup in h_cg, but
the immediately following hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup() overwrites h_cg
with the non-rsvd cgroup pointer.
As a result, hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge_rsvd() stores the wrong
(non-rsvd) cgroup pointer into the folio's rsvd slot.
When the folio is later freed, free_huge_folio() unconditionally calls
both hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio() and
hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_folio_rsvd(). The rsvd uncharge reads back the
wrong cgroup from the folio and decrements a counter that was never
charged for that cgroup, causing a page_counter underflow:
page_counter underflow: -512 nr_pages=512
WARNING: mm/page_counter.c:61 at page_counter_cancel
Fix this by introducing a separate h_cg_rsvd pointer exclusively for the
rsvd charge path, keeping the rsvd and non-rsvd charges fully independent
through their charge, commit, and error uncharge paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: detect mapping-pairs LCN accumulator overflow
The NTFS mapping-pairs parser accumulates relative LCN deltas in a
signed integer. A corrupted attribute can drive that addition past
the representable range.
One corrupt runlist shape sets the accumulated LCN to S64_MAX and
then adds a delta of 1 in the next mapping-pairs entry.
Signed overflow is undefined and can turn an invalid runlist into a
different set of physical clusters.
Check the LCN addition for overflow before storing the next run. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: reject short AUTH_RECEIVE buffers
nvmet_execute_auth_receive() trusts the AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length
after checking only that it is nonzero and matches the transfer length.
In the SUCCESS1 and FAILURE1/default states, that lets a remote NVMe-oF
initiator reach the fixed-size DH-HMAC-CHAP response builders with a
kmalloc() buffer shorter than the response, so nvmet_auth_success1() and
nvmet_auth_failure1() write past the allocation; both only WARN_ON the
short length and then format the message anyway.
Impact: A remote NVMe-oF initiator with access to an auth-enabled target
can trigger a 16-byte heap out-of-bounds write via a one-byte
AUTH_RECEIVE allocation length.
Compute the minimum response length for the current DH-HMAC-CHAP step in
nvmet_auth_receive_data_len() and report a zero data length when the
host-supplied allocation length is shorter, so the existing zero-length
check in nvmet_execute_auth_receive() rejects the command before any
builder runs. The SUCCESS1 minimum is sizeof(struct
nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data) plus the HMAC hash length, because the
response hash is written into the rval[] flexible-array tail, so the
minimum is state dependent rather than a flat sizeof. CHALLENGE keeps its
existing variable-length guard in nvmet_auth_challenge().
This is reachable only when in-band DH-HMAC-CHAP authentication is
configured on the target. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-ioctl: fix a possible overflow in list_version_get_info
sizeof(tt->version) is 12 bytes, but the code writes 16 bytes into the
output buffer - info->vers->version[0], info->vers->version[1],
info->vers->version[2] and info->vers->next. This can cause buffer
overflow.
Fix this buffer overflow by replacing "sizeof(tt->version)" with
"sizeof(struct dm_target_versions)". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length
ieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the
common information length for all known MLE types. However,
ieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe
Request, and TDLS MLEs.
Reconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the
minimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the
advertised common information length.
Account for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate
the advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep
unknown-type handling unchanged.
[remove now misleading comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey
Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length
fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check
in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size.
The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that
were used in operations without proper validation against both the
actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker
could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to
reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or
exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the
crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value
and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects
as a over-read.
So now a key must
- key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct
- the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of
sizeof key token struct ... key buf length |
