| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: Keep the NOC_HDCP clock enabled
Keep the NOC_HDCP clock always enabled to fix the potential hang
caused by the NoC ADB400 port power down handshake. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_hid: don't call cdev_init while cdev in use
When calling unbind, then bind again, cdev_init reinitialized the cdev,
even though there may still be references to it. That's the case when
the /dev/hidg* device is still opened. This obviously unsafe behavior
like oopes.
This fixes this by using cdev_alloc to put the cdev on the heap. That
way, we can simply allocate a new one in hidg_bind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: verisilicon: Fix kernel panic due to __initconst misuse
Fix a kernel panic when probing the driver as a module:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
ffffd9c18eb05000
of_find_matching_node_and_match+0x5c/0x1a0
hantro_probe+0x2f4/0x7d0 [hantro_vpu]
The imx8mq_vpu_shared_resources array is referenced by variant
structures through their shared_devices field. When built as a
module, __initconst causes this data to be freed after module
init, but it's later accessed during probe, causing a page fault.
The imx8mq_vpu_shared_resources is referenced from non-init code,
so keeping __initconst or __initconst_or_module here is wrong.
Drop the __initconst annotation and let it live in the normal .rodata
section.
A bug of __initconst called from regular non-init probe code
leading to bugs during probe deferrals or during unbind-bind cycles. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-dw-dma: fix print error log when wait finish transaction
If an error occurs, the device may not have a current message. In this
case, the system will crash.
In this case, it's better to use dev from the struct ctlr (struct spi_controller*). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: move async event work off nvmet-wq
For target nvmet_ctrl_free() flushes ctrl->async_event_work.
If nvmet_ctrl_free() runs on nvmet-wq, the flush re-enters workqueue
completion for the same worker:-
A. Async event work queued on nvmet-wq (prior to disconnect):
nvmet_execute_async_event()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work)
nvmet_add_async_event()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &ctrl->async_event_work)
B. Full pre-work chain (RDMA CM path):
nvmet_rdma_cm_handler()
nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect()
__nvmet_rdma_queue_disconnect()
queue_work(nvmet_wq, &queue->release_work)
process_one_work()
lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq) <--------- 1st
nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work()
C. Recursive path (same worker):
nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work()
nvmet_rdma_free_queue()
nvmet_sq_destroy()
nvmet_ctrl_put()
nvmet_ctrl_free()
flush_work(&ctrl->async_event_work)
__flush_work()
touch_wq_lockdep_map()
lock((wq_completion)nvmet-wq) <--------- 2nd
Lockdep splat:
============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.19.0-rc3nvme+ #14 Tainted: G N
--------------------------------------------
kworker/u192:42/44933 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53e/0x660
3 locks held by kworker/u192:42/44933:
#0: ffff888118a00948 ((wq_completion)nvmet-wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53e/0x660
#1: ffffc9000e6cbe28 ((work_completion)(&queue->release_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1c5/0x660
#2: ffffffff82d4db60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0x62/0x530
Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work [nvmet_rdma]
Call Trace:
__flush_work+0x268/0x530
nvmet_ctrl_free+0x140/0x310 [nvmet]
nvmet_cq_put+0x74/0x90 [nvmet]
nvmet_rdma_free_queue+0x23/0xe0 [nvmet_rdma]
nvmet_rdma_release_queue_work+0x19/0x50 [nvmet_rdma]
process_one_work+0x206/0x660
worker_thread+0x184/0x320
kthread+0x10c/0x240
ret_from_fork+0x319/0x390
Move async event work to a dedicated nvmet-aen-wq to avoid reentrant
flush on nvmet-wq. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: nexthop: allocate skb dynamically in rtm_get_nexthop()
When querying a nexthop object via RTM_GETNEXTHOP, the kernel currently
allocates a fixed-size skb using NLMSG_GOODSIZE. While sufficient for
single nexthops and small Equal-Cost Multi-Path groups, this fixed
allocation fails for large nexthop groups like 512 nexthops.
This results in the following warning splat:
WARNING: net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395 at rtm_get_nexthop+0x176/0x1c0, CPU#20: rep/4608
[...]
RIP: 0010:rtm_get_nexthop (net/ipv4/nexthop.c:3395)
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6989)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:721 net/socket.c:736 net/socket.c:2585)
___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2641)
__sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2671)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Fix this by allocating the size dynamically using nh_nlmsg_size() and
using nlmsg_new(), this is consistent with nexthop_notify() behavior. In
addition, adjust nh_nlmsg_size_grp() so it calculates the size needed
based on flags passed. While at it, also add the size of NHA_FDB for
nexthop group size calculation as it was missing too.
This cannot be reproduced via iproute2 as the group size is currently
limited and the command fails as follows:
addattr_l ERROR: message exceeded bound of 1048 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: prevent immediate PASID reuse case
PASID resue could cause interrupt issue when process
immediately runs into hw state left by previous
process exited with the same PASID, it's possible that
page faults are still pending in the IH ring buffer when
the process exits and frees up its PASID. To prevent the
case, it uses idr cyclic allocator same as kernel pid's.
(cherry picked from commit 8f1de51f49be692de137c8525106e0fce2d1912d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use volume UUID in FS_OBJECT_ID_INFORMATION
Use sb->s_uuid for a proper volume identifier as the primary choice.
For filesystems that do not provide a UUID, fall back to stfs.f_fsid
obtained from vfs_statfs(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: log new dentries when logging parent dir of a conflicting inode
If we log the parent directory of a conflicting inode, we are not logging
the new dentries of the directory, so when we finish we have the parent
directory's inode marked as logged but we did not log its new dentries.
As a consequence if the parent directory is explicitly fsynced later and
it does not have any new changes since we logged it, the fsync is a no-op
and after a power failure the new dentries are missing.
Example scenario:
$ mkdir foo
$ sync
$rmdir foo
$ mkdir dir1
$ mkdir dir2
# A file with the same name and parent as the directory we just deleted
# and was persisted in a past transaction. So the deleted directory's
# inode is a conflicting inode of this new file's inode.
$ touch foo
$ ln foo dir2/link
# The fsync on dir2 will log the parent directory (".") because the
# conflicting inode (deleted directory) does not exists anymore, but it
# it does not log its new dentries (dir1).
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" dir2
# This fsync on the parent directory is no-op, since the previous fsync
# logged it (but without logging its new dentries).
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" .
<power failure>
# After log replay dir1 is missing.
Fix this by ensuring we log new dir dentries whenever we log the parent
directory of a no longer existing conflicting inode.
A test case for fstests will follow soon. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: clone set on flush only
Syzbot with fault injection triggered a failing memory allocation with
GFP_KERNEL which results in a WARN splat:
iter.err
WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 at nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5992
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5992 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845
Code: 8b 05 86 5a 4e 09 48 3b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 75 62 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 63 6d fa f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 43
+80 7c 35 00 00 0f 85 23 fe ff ff e9 26 fe ff ff 89 d9
RSP: 0018:ffffc900045af780 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89ca45bd RBX: 00000000fffffff4 RCX: ffff888028111e40
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff4 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc900045af870 R08: 0000000000400dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d141db R12: ffffc900045af7e0
R13: 1ffff920008b5f24 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc900045af920
FS: 000055557a6a5500(0000) GS:ffff888125496000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb5ea271fc0 CR3: 000000003269e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__nft_release_table+0xceb/0x11f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12115
nft_rcv_nl_event+0xc25/0xdb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12187
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:380
netlink_release+0x123b/0x1ad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:761
__sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
sock_close+0xc3/0x240 net/socket.c:1455
Restrict set clone to the flush set command in the preparation phase.
Add NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE and use it for this purpose, update the rbtree
and pipapo backends to only clone the set when this iteration type is
used.
As for the existing NFT_ITER_UPDATE type, update the pipapo backend to
use the existing set clone if available, otherwise use the existing set
representation. After this update, there is no need to clone a set that
is being deleted, this includes bound anonymous set.
An alternative approach to NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE is to add a .clone
interface and call it from the flush set path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Force 8-byte alignment for JIT buffer to prevent atomic tearing
struct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT
allocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT
buffer.
Because the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g.,
ending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails
to ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.
This leads to two issues:
1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the
structure.
2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in
bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT'd code executes ldr. On arm64,
64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if
they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read,
causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.
Fix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes
(sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of
the JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math
in build_plt() to correctly align the target field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: change XDP RxQ frag_size from DMA write length to xdp.frame_sz
The only user of frag_size field in XDP RxQ info is
bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(). It clearly expects whole buff size instead
of DMA write size. Different assumptions in ice driver configuration lead
to negative tailroom.
This allows to trigger kernel panic, when using
XDP_ADJUST_TAIL_GROW_MULTI_BUFF xskxceiver test and changing packet size to
6912 and the requested offset to a huge value, e.g.
XSK_UMEM__MAX_FRAME_SIZE * 100.
Due to other quirks of the ZC configuration in ice, panic is not observed
in ZC mode, but tailroom growing still fails when it should not.
Use fill queue buffer truesize instead of DMA write size in XDP RxQ info.
Fix ZC mode too by using the new helper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blktrace: fix __this_cpu_read/write in preemptible context
tracing_record_cmdline() internally uses __this_cpu_read() and
__this_cpu_write() on the per-CPU variable trace_cmdline_save, and
trace_save_cmdline() explicitly asserts preemption is disabled via
lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled(). These operations are only safe
when preemption is off, as they were designed to be called from the
scheduler context (probe_wakeup_sched_switch() / probe_wakeup()).
__blk_add_trace() was calling tracing_record_cmdline(current) early in
the blk_tracer path, before ring buffer reservation, from process
context where preemption is fully enabled. This triggers the following
using blktests/blktrace/002:
blktrace/002 (blktrace ftrace corruption with sysfs trace) [failed]
runtime 0.367s ... 0.437s
something found in dmesg:
[ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33
[ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created
[ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516
[ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40
[ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full)
[ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST
[ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 81.362881] Call Trace:
[ 81.362884] <TASK>
[ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0
...
(See '/mnt/sda/blktests/results/nodev/blktrace/002.dmesg' for the entire message)
[ 81.211018] run blktests blktrace/002 at 2026-02-25 22:24:33
[ 81.239580] null_blk: disk nullb1 created
[ 81.357294] BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: dd/2516
[ 81.362842] caller is tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40
[ 81.362872] CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 2516 Comm: dd Tainted: G N 7.0.0-rc1lblk+ #84 PREEMPT(full)
[ 81.362877] Tainted: [N]=TEST
[ 81.362878] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 81.362881] Call Trace:
[ 81.362884] <TASK>
[ 81.362886] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xb0
[ 81.362895] check_preemption_disabled+0xce/0xe0
[ 81.362902] tracing_record_cmdline+0x10/0x40
[ 81.362923] __blk_add_trace+0x307/0x5d0
[ 81.362934] ? lock_acquire+0xe0/0x300
[ 81.362940] ? iov_iter_extract_pages+0x101/0xa30
[ 81.362959] blk_add_trace_bio+0x106/0x1e0
[ 81.362968] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x24b/0x3a0
[ 81.362979] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x58/0x260
[ 81.362988] submit_bio_wait+0x56/0x90
[ 81.363009] __blkdev_direct_IO_simple+0x16c/0x250
[ 81.363026] ? __pfx_submit_bio_wait_endio+0x10/0x10
[ 81.363038] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x73/0xa0
[ 81.363051] blkdev_read_iter+0xc1/0x140
[ 81.363059] vfs_read+0x20b/0x330
[ 81.363083] ksys_read+0x67/0xe0
[ 81.363090] do_syscall_64+0xbf/0xf00
[ 81.363102] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 81.363106] RIP: 0033:0x7f281906029d
[ 81.363111] Code: 31 c0 e9 c6 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 66 63 0a 00 e8 59 ff 01 00 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 80 3d 41 33 0e 00 00 74 17 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 5b c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec
[ 81.363113] RSP: 002b:00007ffca127dd48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 81.363120] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f281906029d
[ 81.363122] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 0000559f8bfae000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 81.363123] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000002863a10a81 R09: 00007f281915f000
[ 81.363124] R10: 00007f2818f77b60 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000559f8bfae000
[ 81.363126] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000a
[ 81.363142] </TASK>
The same BUG fires from blk_add_trace_plug(), blk_add_trace_unplug(),
and blk_add_trace_rq() paths as well.
The purpose of tracin
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/deadline: Fix missing ENQUEUE_REPLENISH during PI de-boosting
Running stress-ng --schedpolicy 0 on an RT kernel on a big machine
might lead to the following WARNINGs (edited).
sched: DL de-boosted task PID 22725: REPLENISH flag missing
WARNING: CPU: 93 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/deadline.c:239 dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8
... (running_bw underflow)
Call trace:
dequeue_task_dl+0x15c/0x1f8 (P)
dequeue_task+0x80/0x168
deactivate_task+0x24/0x50
push_dl_task+0x264/0x2e0
dl_task_timer+0x1b0/0x228
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x188/0x378
hrtimer_interrupt+0xfc/0x260
...
The problem is that when a SCHED_DEADLINE task (lock holder) is
changed to a lower priority class via sched_setscheduler(), it may
fail to properly inherit the parameters of potential DEADLINE donors
if it didn't already inherit them in the past (shorter deadline than
donor's at that time). This might lead to bandwidth accounting
corruption, as enqueue_task_dl() won't recognize the lock holder as
boosted.
The scenario occurs when:
1. A DEADLINE task (donor) blocks on a PI mutex held by another
DEADLINE task (holder), but the holder doesn't inherit parameters
(e.g., it already has a shorter deadline)
2. sched_setscheduler() changes the holder from DEADLINE to a lower
class while still holding the mutex
3. The holder should now inherit DEADLINE parameters from the donor
and be enqueued with ENQUEUE_REPLENISH, but this doesn't happen
Fix the issue by introducing __setscheduler_dl_pi(), which detects when
a DEADLINE (proper or boosted) task gets setscheduled to a lower
priority class. In case, the function makes the task inherit DEADLINE
parameters of the donoer (pi_se) and sets ENQUEUE_REPLENISH flag to
ensure proper bandwidth accounting during the next enqueue operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: always walk all pending catchall elements
During transaction processing we might have more than one catchall element:
1 live catchall element and 1 pending element that is coming as part of the
new batch.
If the map holding the catchall elements is also going away, its
required to toggle all catchall elements and not just the first viable
candidate.
Otherwise, we get:
WARNING: ./include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1281 at nft_data_release+0xb7/0xe0 [nf_tables], CPU#2: nft/1404
RIP: 0010:nft_data_release+0xb7/0xe0 [nf_tables]
[..]
__nft_set_elem_destroy+0x106/0x380 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_abort_release+0x348/0x8d0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_abort+0xcf2/0x3ac0 [nf_tables]
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x9c9/0x20e0 [..] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: unconditionally bump set->nelems before insertion
In case that the set is full, a new element gets published then removed
without waiting for the RCU grace period, while RCU reader can be
walking over it already.
To address this issue, add the element transaction even if set is full,
but toggle the set_full flag to report -ENFILE so the abort path safely
unwinds the set to its previous state.
As for element updates, decrement set->nelems to restore it.
A simpler fix is to call synchronize_rcu() in the error path.
However, with a large batch adding elements to already maxed-out set,
this could cause noticeable slowdown of such batches. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: secure_seq: add back ports to TS offset
This reverts 28ee1b746f49 ("secure_seq: downgrade to per-host timestamp offsets")
tcp_tw_recycle went away in 2017.
Zhouyan Deng reported off-path TCP source port leakage via
SYN cookie side-channel that can be fixed in multiple ways.
One of them is to bring back TCP ports in TS offset randomization.
As a bonus, we perform a single siphash() computation
to provide both an ISN and a TS offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject new transactions if the fs is fully read-only
[BUG]
There is a bug report where a heavily fuzzed fs is mounted with all
rescue mount options, which leads to the following warnings during
unmount:
BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -22)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9758 Comm: repro.out Not tainted
6.19.0-rc5-00002-gb71e635feefc #7 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:find_free_extent_update_loop fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4208 [inline]
RIP: 0010:find_free_extent+0x52f0/0x5d20 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4611
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x2cd/0x790 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4705
btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1e1/0x10e0 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5157
btrfs_force_cow_block+0x578/0x2410 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:517
btrfs_cow_block+0x3c4/0xa80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:708
btrfs_search_slot+0xcad/0x2b50 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2130
btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x45d/0x2350 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:499
btrfs_evict_inode+0x923/0xe70 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5628
evict+0x5f4/0xae0 fs/inode.c:837
__dentry_kill+0x209/0x660 fs/dcache.c:670
finish_dput+0xc9/0x480 fs/dcache.c:879
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0xa0/0x170 fs/dcache.c:1661
generic_shutdown_super+0x67/0x2c0 fs/super.c:621
kill_anon_super+0x3b/0x70 fs/super.c:1289
btrfs_kill_super+0x41/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2127
deactivate_locked_super+0xbc/0x130 fs/super.c:474
cleanup_mnt+0x425/0x4c0 fs/namespace.c:1318
task_work_run+0x1d4/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:233
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x694/0x22f0 kernel/exit.c:971
do_group_exit+0x21c/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1112
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1123 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1121 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1121
x64_sys_call+0x2210/0x2210 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe8/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x44f639
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x44f60f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffc15c4e088 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004c32f0 RCX: 000000000044f639
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004c32f0
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
</TASK>
Since rescue mount options will mark the full fs read-only, there should
be no new transaction triggered.
But during unmount we will evict all inodes, which can trigger a new
transaction, and triggers warnings on a heavily corrupted fs.
[CAUSE]
Btrfs allows new transaction even on a read-only fs, this is to allow
log replay happen even on read-only mounts, just like what ext4/xfs do.
However with rescue mount options, the fs is fully read-only and cannot
be remounted read-write, thus in that case we should also reject any new
transactions.
[FIX]
If we find the fs has rescue mount options, we should treat the fs as
error, so that no new transaction can be started. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/pm: Disable MMIO access during SMU Mode 1 reset
During Mode 1 reset, the ASIC undergoes a reset cycle and becomes
temporarily inaccessible via PCIe. Any attempt to access MMIO registers
during this window (e.g., from interrupt handlers or other driver threads)
can result in uncompleted PCIe transactions, leading to NMI panics or
system hangs.
To prevent this, set the `no_hw_access` flag to true immediately after
triggering the reset. This signals other driver components to skip
register accesses while the device is offline.
A memory barrier `smp_mb()` is added to ensure the flag update is
globally visible to all cores before the driver enters the sleep/wait
state.
(cherry picked from commit 7edb503fe4b6d67f47d8bb0dfafb8e699bb0f8a4) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Add recursion protection in kernel stack trace recording
A bug was reported about an infinite recursion caused by tracing the rcu
events with the kernel stack trace trigger enabled. The stack trace code
called back into RCU which then called the stack trace again.
Expand the ftrace recursion protection to add a set of bits to protect
events from recursion. Each bit represents the context that the event is
in (normal, softirq, interrupt and NMI).
Have the stack trace code use the interrupt context to protect against
recursion.
Note, the bug showed an issue in both the RCU code as well as the tracing
stacktrace code. This only handles the tracing stack trace side of the
bug. The RCU fix will be handled separately. |
